Probing mu-term Generation Mechanism in String Models

We give a generic method to select a realistic $\mu$-term generation mechanism based on the radiative electroweak symmetry breaking scenario and study which type is hopeful within the framework of string theory. We discuss effects of the moduli F-term condensation and D-term contribution to soft scalar masses.Comment: Latex, 17 pages, 4 Postscript figure

Sum rules in the superpartner spectrum of the minimal supersymmetric standard model

Assuming that the string inspired, universal sum rules for soft supersymmetry-breaking terms, which have been recently found both in a wide class of four-dimensional superstrings and in supersymmertic gauge-Yukawa unified gauge models, are satisfied above and at the grand unification scale, we investigate theirlow energy consequences and derive sum rules in the superpartner spectrum of the minimal supersymmetric standard model.Comment: 10 pages, LaTex 4 figure

Non-perturbative Kahler Potential, Dilaton Stabilization and Fayet-Iliopoulos Term

We study the dilaton stabilization in models with anomalous U(1) symmetry by adding specific string-motivated, non-perturbative corrections to the tree-level dilaton K\"{a}hler potential. We find that the non-perturbative effects can stabilize the dilaton at a desirably large value. We also observe that the size of Fayet-Iliopoulos term is reduced at the stabilized point.Comment: 10 pages, 2 figure

Generic Formula of Soft Scalar Masses in String Models

We derive formula of soft supersymmetry breaking scalar masses from 4-dimensional string models within a more generic framework. We consider effects of extra gauge symmetry breakings including an anomalous $U(1)$ breaking through flat directions, that is, $D$-term and $F$-term contributions, particle mixing effects and heavy-light mass mixing effects. Some phenomenological implications are discussed based on our mass formula.Comment: 46 pages, latex, no figure

Gauge Coupling Sum Rule as a Unification Barometer

Article信州大学理学部紀要 35(2): 55-67(2001)departmental bulletin pape

Implementation of Economic Sanctions

This dissertation investigates implementation problems in economic sanctions and how a state's concerns about policy implementation affect its decisions and the outcomes of sanctions. This study builds on the premise that sanctions are carried out by firms within a sanctioning state, not the state itself. First, using a game-theoretical model, I show that firms' non-compliance with sanction policies not only undermines the effectiveness of unilateral sanctions, but also has a counter-intuitive effect on a sanctioning state's decision to impose sanctions. The model suggests that a state is more likely to impose sanctions when it anticipates firms' non-compliance. A number of empirical implications are derived from the model and corroborated with data. Second, this study also investigates a sanctioning state's decision to sanction multilaterally or unilaterally, and how its expectations about the enforcement of sanctions influence this decision. When the enforcement of unilateral sanctions is expected to be difficult, the state is more likely to sanction multilaterally, but only when it has enough resources and the bureaucratic capability to help other states enforce their sanctions. The empirical evidence also buttresses these theoretical results. This study highlights the importance of incorporating expectations about enforcement into a full understanding of the sanctions processes. The conclusion is that states' ability to influence firms' decisions at home as well as abroad is a crucial determinant of whether they impose, how they design, and the effectiveness of sanctions

Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset

Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing data sets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set. This version of the data extends the temporal domain, corrects errors, updates cases that were ongoing as of the last release, and includes a few additional variables. We describe the dataset, paying special attention to the key differences in the new version, and we present descriptive statistics for some of the key variables, highlighting differences across versions. Since the major change in the data set was to more than double the time period covered, we also present some simple statistics showing trends in sanctions use over time

Public Opinion and Foreign Aid Cuts in Economic Crises

Economic crises generally lead to reductions in foreign aid. However, the widely held view that budgetary constraints caused by economic crises reduce aid is inaccurate because donor government outlays actually tend to increase. We develop an argument that aid cuts occur because voters place a lower priority on aid during economic downturns and politicians respond by cutting aid. Using data from Eurobarometer, we demonstrate that economic downturns lead to reduced public support for helping the poor abroad. These findings are robust across a large number of alternative specifications. Our findings have implications for how advocates may prevent aid reductions during economic recessions